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ABSTRACT. The debt-resource-hypothesis suggests that high indebtedness leads to
increased natural resource exploitation as well as more unsustainable patterns of resource
use. Countries with high debt burdens supposedly increase their extraction of fossil fuels
and mineral resources as well as their production of so-called cash crops in order to
service their debt obligations. In spite of its popularity, there have been few attempts to
systematically test the hypothesis. Existing analyses refer to deforestation only and come
to mixed results. This study ﬁlls a gap in testing the hypothesis more comprehensively
for 23 natural resources and cash crops. It uses ﬁrst differencing, period-speciﬁc time
dummies, and a lagged dependent variable tomitigate omitted variable bias. No evidence
is found that would support the debt-resource-hypothesis.
1. Introduction
Many environmentalists believe that the high indebtedness of developing
countries triggers increased exploitation and more unsustainable use of
their natural resources. Indeed, the validity of what we will refer to as
the debt-resource-hypothesis, or the DRH for short, seems to be taken for
granted by many as a matter of fact. In this article we will attempt to test
the DRH quantitatively and we fail to ﬁnd evidence in its favour. Whilst
not providing a conclusive proof against the DRH, our results shed doubt
on its validity and should warn environmentalists and policy makers alike
against believing too easily that high indebtedness spurs exploitation of
natural resources.
Astonishingly, in spite of its popularity, there have been few attempts to
systematically empirically test the DRH. There only seem to exist studies
examining the link between debt and deforestation, but none that looks at
other forms of natural resource exploitation. Indeed, even more generally,
Pearce et al. (1995: 29) contend that ‘the impact of indebtedness on other
environmental indicators such as pollution, biodiversity or depletion of
other resources has not been tested’. This article cannot address pollution
or biodiversity loss, but it attempts to ﬁll the gap in the literature with
I would like to thank two anonymous referees as well as Steve Gibbons, Marten
Goos, Alan Manning and Michele Pellizzari for many helpful suggestions.
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respect to natural resources, namely subsoil fuel and mineral resources as
well as export-oriented agricultural crops, so-called cash crops. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study testing theDRHon a comprehensive
range of natural resources. It thus complements the existing studies on the
link between indebtedness and deforestation.
We start with an illustration of the widespread popularity of the DRH
and a presentation of the reasons why high indebtedness might increase
resource exploitation. After a review of the existing empirical literature and
a discussion of our research design we report results that are subjected to a
range of sensitivity tests. In the light of the reported results, the concluding
section warns against taking the DRH simply for granted, but also cautions
against taking our results as deﬁnite proof against the hypothesis.
2. The potential impact of indebtedness on resource exploitation
Whilst existing empirical studies seem to have exclusively focused on
deforestation, the DRH is certainly not conﬁned to deforestation in the
eyes of its proponents. Calvert and Calvert (1999: 9), for example, suggest
debt to be ‘a driving force leading to overexploitation of soil and subsoil
resources in the process of seeking tomaximize foreign exchange earnings’.
Similarly broadly, George (1989: 156) argues that high debts are repayed ‘by
cashing innatural resources’. ThePhilippine’s Freedom fromDebtCoalition
believes that its country’s indebtedness leads to ‘destroying our forests to
export wood, ruining our coral reefs to export ﬁsh, and exhausting our soils
by applying heavy pesticides and chemical fertilizers to facilitate export-
oriented agriculture’ (cited in De la Court, 1992: 92).1 The DRH has even
been adopted by ofﬁcial bodies. It has been taken on board by, for example,
the World Commission on Environment and Development (the so-called
Brundtland Commission). Its famous ‘Our Common Future’ report states
that ‘debtors are being required to use trade surpluses to service debts,
and are drawing heavily on non-renewable resources to do so’ (WCED,
1987: 18). Even more drastically, the Commission maintains that ‘debts that
they cannotpay forceAfricannations relyingon commodity sales to overuse
their fragile soils, thus turning good land to desert’ (ibid.: 6).
The DRH has been particularly popular amongst environmentalist
groups. The US branch of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), for
example, warns that ‘demand for foreign exchange to service debts. . .
has provided an impetus for developing countries to mine their natural
resources’ (WWF–US, 2000: 5). Friends of the Earth asked governments
in the run-up to the World Summit on Sustainable Development in
Johannesburg in 2002 ‘to note that external debt fuels the depletion of
natural resources’ (FoE, 2002: 2). The Worldwatch Institute (2001) suggests
that ‘debt pressure has spurred increases in export-oriented mining and
1 Note that even if the DRH was valid, the environmental implications would
not always be clear-cut. For example, the mere swap from crops produced for
domestic consumption to cash crops for export purposes need not imply more
environmental degradation, since cash crops such as coffee and cocoa might be
less environmentally destructive than other non-cash crops such as potatoes or
manioc (Gerster, 1992: 233).
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logging in developing countries’. The Global Legislators Organization for a
Balanced Environment (GLOBE), an association of members of parliament
from over 100 national parliaments, also maintains that ‘pressure of debt
repayments often causes overexploitation of natural resources’ in their
resolution to the Johannesburg summit (GLOBE, 2002).
The most common explanation of why high indebtedness might trigger
increased resource exploitation andmore unsustainable resource use seems
to be that high indebtedness is seen as forcing countries to earn more and
spend less in order to ﬁnance their debt obligations – if not a reduction of
their debts, then at least servicing the interest on their debts. As a result,
developing countries ‘will give priority to what they can easily produce:
primary products that sell at low prices on the world market. They have
every incentive to use intensive agriculture to produce cash crops and to
exhaustmineral resources as quickly as possible’ (Calvert andCalvert, 1999:
205). Moreover, since many developing countries try to earn higher export
revenues via exploiting their natural resources, the proponents of the DRH
suggest this is leading to a vicious circle: ‘With somany jostling for a share of
limited world markets, prices plummet, forcing governments to seek ever-
higher levels of exports in a desperate attempt to keep their hard currency
revenues stable’ (George, 1992: 2).
There have also been a few attempts at formally modelling the DRH
(see, for example, Kahn and McDonald, 1995; Rauscher, 1989, 1990, 1997;
Strand, 1995, 1997). As the focus of this article is empirical rather than
theoretical, we will merely present the main results of these models.
Kahn and McDonald (1995) in their analysis suggest that one needs to
demonstratewhyhigh indebtedness should change the rate of deforestation
if a particular rate was seen as optimal and income maximizing before.
They show in a dynamic optimization framework that high indebtedness
might drive a wedge between deforestation strategies that are optimal in
the short run as opposed to the long run and induce countries to pursue
myopic policies resulting in ‘excessive’ deforestation. The intuition behind
this result is that if one assumes that policy makers are constrained in
their inter-temporal trade-off, such that current consumption must not
fall beyond a certain minimum level, then high levels of indebtedness
can induce policy makers to resort to deforestation in order to meet this
minimum level of consumption. More generally, variables contributing
to income and therefore to meeting the minimum level of consumption,
such as a high labour force participation rate, decrease deforestation.
Conversely, variables that compete for the use of income (investment,
government spending, debt service) increase deforestation. Note that their
model has been developed with respect to deforestation, but it is generally
transferable to the exploitation of other natural resources. Rauscher’s (1989,
1990, 1997) dynamic optimization models do not assume a minimum level
of consumption. Instead he shows how higher indebtedness can lead to
increased renewable resource exploitation in the presence of imperfect
capital markets. The intuition behind this result is that in imperfect capital
markets the interest rate to be paid on a marginal increase in debt is likely
to be an increasing function of the existing total debt stock. In other words,
the higher the existing debt stock, the higher the marginal cost of being
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indebted. To reduce this cost, natural resource owning countries can resort
to exploiting their resources more than they would otherwise do in order to
pay back some of the debt. The high initial indebtedness therefore induces
the indebted country to deviate from the rate of resource extraction, which
would otherwise be socially efﬁcient. In the two-period models of Strand
(1995, 1997) increased resource exploitation is also shown to be a rational
response of countries with a high level of initial debt in order to reduce new
borrowing.
3. Existing empirical evidence
What does the empirical evidence tell us on the DRH? The fervour with
which the DRH is put forward by some of its proponents stands in stark
contrast to the lack of systematic empirical evidence in its support. Mostly,
anecdotal evidence and examples are presented (see, for example, George,
1989, 1992; Calvert and Calvert, 1999). Susan George believes that with
respect to deforestation the ﬁgures simply ‘speak for themselves’ and that
therefore no systematic quantitative analysis is needed. George (1992: 9)
suggests that:
 Third world countries that deforested the most or the fastest in the 1980s
were also, on the whole, the largest debtors.
 In a number of smaller countries with less signiﬁcant forest reserves, the
fastest deforesters were also the most heavily indebted.
 Countries with the highest ‘debt service ratios’ or subject to the highest
levels of IMF ‘conditionality’ also tend to be the largest and fastest
deforesters.
Not all qualitative empirical evidence supports the DRH, however. A
1992 report commissioned by the World Wildlife Fund (formerly World
Wide Fund for Nature, WWF) consists of three case studies from Coˆte
d’Ivoire, Mexico, and Thailand (Reed, 1992) and fails to ﬁnd clear evidence
in favour of the DRH. For example, with respect to Coˆte d’Ivoire, a country
with one of the highest deforestation rates in the world, ‘the research team
was unable to establish any evidence that debt directly aggravated or eased
environmental degradation in general or in the forestry sector in particular’
(Reed, 1992: 145). Similarly, the Mexican case study failed to provide any
evidence in favour of the DRH and in the case of Thailand, ‘although
rampant deforestation occurred during the mid-1980s, modelling analysis
did not suggest that this problem was triggered or accelerated in any direct
way by national debt obligations’ (Reed, 1992: 146).
Quantitative econometric analyses exist with respect to deforestation
only and they also fail to provide a clear-cut picture.2 Some studies
provide evidence in favour of the DRH. For example, Kahn and McDonald
(1994, 1995) in ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant effect of the debt service to export ratio on deforestation
rates in the period 1981 to 1985. Kant and Redantz (1997: 77) ﬁnd no
2 Note that we can only review studies here, which included a variable of in-
debtedness. For reviewsof quantitative studies ofdeforestationmoregenerally, see
Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999) and Barbier (2001).
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statistically signiﬁcant relation between indebtedness and deforestation
in Latin America in OLS estimation. Only in maximum likelihood (ML)
estimation, which can be problematic in small samples (Long and Freese,
2001: 65), do they ﬁnd that one million US$ of debt typically leads to 8.4
hectares of annual deforestation inAsia and 27.2 hectares of deforestation in
Latin America. Capistrano (1994) and Capistrano and Kiker (1995), on the
other hand, ﬁnd in OLS estimation that a higher debt service to export ratio
is associatedwith less rather thanmore forest depletion for the period 1972–
1975 only and is not statistically signiﬁcantly related to forest depletion
during either 1967–1971, 1976–1980, or 1981–1985. Shaﬁk (1994) also ﬁnds
debt per capita to be highly insigniﬁcant in his OLS estimation analysis
of the average annual rate of deforestation over the period 1962–1986. A
couple of other, often unpublished, studies also provide rather ambiguous
evidence, as summarized in Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999).
Overall, therefore, the existing evidence for the DRH is limited and
rather inconclusive (for a similar conclusion see, for example, Barrow,
1995: 291 and Pearce et al., 1995). Most importantly, it is conﬁned to
examining deforestation. The following sections therefore try to test the
DRH systematically for a wide range of other natural resources, thus
complementing the existing literature on deforestation.
4. Research design
To estimate the underlying causal mechanisms or driving forces behind
natural resource exploitation is a very difﬁcult task because of two
problems. First, on a conceptual level, it is not entirely clear which factors
can be expected to drive exploitation. Even for deforestation, the topic that
has attracted most attention, there is no agreement on which factors should
be included. Most would include population growth/density, macro-
economic variables such as income, trade openness, and the real exchange
rate, as well as variables relating to wood production and agriculture
(subsidies, productivity, export value). But there is no consensus on which
variables need to be included and how they should be deﬁned. If anything,
modelling the determinants of exploitation of a wide range of natural
resources is even more complicated than modelling the determinants
of deforestation, which might be one of the reasons for the focus
on deforestation in existing studies. Second, on a practical level, many
of the variables, which theoretical analysis might suggest as important
determinants, are not available at all or only for a few countries and for
small time periods. A country’s extraction of natural resources is likely to be
a function of numerous factors besides a country’s extent of indebtedness.
Such factors include the total reserve stock and resource discoveries, the
quality of the mineral ore, fossil fuel deposit, or the productivity of land,
the availability or emergence of substitute resources, capital and labour
costs, the state of extraction technology, the size of the domestic market,
the costs of transportation to foreign markets, the real effective exchange
rate, and the existence of producer cartels such as the Organization of
PetroleumExporting Countries (OPEC) or theAssociation of Tin Producing
Countries. It will also be affected by political interventions such as taxation
and subsidies, price and exchange rate controls, environmental and trade
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regulations, the type of ownership (government or private, domestic,
or multinational), political events, and strikes (Siebert, 1985; Rees, 1990;
Dobozi, 1993). State ownership of the resource is an important variable,
as such ownership makes it easier to channel the proﬁts from resource
exploitation directly into repaying public debts. Dobozi (1993) provides
evidence from the copper industry that suggests that governmentsuse state-
owned copperminingﬁrms as amacroeconomic tool to copewith balance of
payments difﬁculties. However, the share of state ownership is impossible
to establish for manymarkets. More generally, there can be no pretence that
the factors determining resource exploitation could be adequately included
in empirical estimation. As a consequence of both problems, empirical tests
of theDRHare likely to suffer from omitted variable bias if the debt variable
is correlated with one or more omitted variables.
Panel data estimation techniques are ideally suited for mitigating the
problem of omitted variables. With panel data, the technique of ﬁrst
differencing the data can wipe out any time-invariant country effect, which
eliminates already one important source of potential omitted variable
bias. Period-speciﬁc dummy variables account for temporal changes
in worldwide demand for natural resources such that the potential
simultaneous increase in resource exploitation and indebtedness over time
does not result in spurious regression results. Most importantly, as Nair-
Reichert and Weinhold (2001: 162) note, panel data analysis allows the
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, which provides ‘an excellent
proxy variable for many omitted variables’ as these variables are likely
to be strongly correlated with the lagged dependent variable (see also
Finkel, 1995). In addition, since panel data draw upon both cross-sectional
and over-time variation in the data, one can capture both an ‘acute’
and a ‘chronic’ potential effect of indebtedness on resource exploitation.3
The ‘acute’ effect would show in the dynamics of resource exploitation
over time, with an increase in indebtedness triggering increased resource
exploitation. The ‘chronic’ effect would show in the cross-sectional
dimension of the data as highly indebted countries would have higher
resource exploitation at any moment of time.
We therefore estimate the following dynamic model for each resource
Pit = α + γtTt + δPi−1 + φ1Xit + φ2Xit−1 + i t , where i t = ui + vit.
Pit and Pit−1 is production (extraction) in country i in period t and
t− 1, respectively. The Tt capture any period speciﬁc effects not included
in the regressors, for example temporal changes in worldwide demand
for the resource. As mentioned above, Pit−1 can function as a proxy
of omitted variables. In addition, it can also account for inter-temporal
persistence (‘sluggishness’) in resource extraction. TheXit and Xit−1 include
our explanatory vairables, namely the extent of indebtedness as our major
variable of interest as well as possibly other control variables. Inclusion
of the two terms together allows for both a current as well as lagged effect
3 Such a distinction between ‘acute’ and ‘chronic’ effect is inspired by epidemiology.
I am thankful to an anonymous referee for suggesting it.
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of the debt variable on resource production. We use different speciﬁcat-
ions of the lag length as well as the type of lag included in sensitivity
analysis. The ui are supposed to capture any country speciﬁc time-invariant
effects not included in the explanatory variables.
Estimating equation (1) with either OLS or a ﬁxed-effects or ﬁrst-
differenced panel estimator is problematic. This is because of the inclusion
of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. Since Pit is a function of ui,
so is Pit−1. The correlation of a regressorwith the error term renders theOLS
estimator both biased and inconsistent. The same is true for the ﬁxed-effects
or ﬁrst-differenced estimator, as ﬁrst noted by Nickell (1981) and Anderson
and Hsiao (1981). Whilst in the process of estimation the ui are wiped out,
biasedness and inconsistency is a consequence of the correlation between
Pit−1 and vit−1 (Baltagi, 1995: 126).
There are twoways to estimate equation (1)without bias and consistently.
One is to follow Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and to use a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) ﬁrst-differenced estimator, that is, a ﬁrst differenced esti-
mator with instrumental variables. First differencing wipes out the ui
and using either Pit−2 or Pit−2 (that is, Pit−2 − Pit−3) as an instrument
for Pit−1 solves the problem since neither instrument is correlated with
vit. In addition, further lags can be included. Alternatively, one can use
the so-called Arellano and Bond (1991) Generalized Method of Moments
estimator. The basic idea of this estimator is to use all prior dependent
variables that are valid instruments, not just Pit−2. We will use the Arellano
and Bond dynamic panel estimator for the main estimations and the 2SLS
ﬁrst-differenced estimator in sensitivity analysis.When employing the 2SLS
ﬁrst-differenced estimator we follow Arellano’s (1989) advice and use the
levels Pit−2 and Pit−3 rather than the differences Pit−2 and Pit−3 as
instruments. In sensitivity analysis, we further use a ﬁxed-effects estimator,
a random-effects estimator, which draws upon both cross-sectional and
over-time variation in the data, and a between estimator, which is purely
cross-sectional.
Natural resource extraction data in thousand metric tons for bauxite,
copper, gold, hardcoal, iron, lead, lignite, natural gas, nickel, oil, phosphate,
silver, tin, and zinc are taken from World Bank (2001a). Production data in
thousand metric tons for the following most important cash crops come
from FAO (2002): bananas, cashew nuts, cocoa beans, coffee, cotton, natural
rubber, soybeans, sugar cane, tea, and tobacco.4 Whilst the FAO data cover
practically all countries in the world, some very small countries are missing
from the World Bank data set. Estimations refer to countries with some
positive amount of extraction of a natural resource or production of a
cash crop only. It is clear that our dependent variable captures the level
of resource extraction, but covers unsustainable resource use only to the
4 We did not use net export data as for some natural resources no such data were
available or are less reliable than production data. However, there is a very strong
correlation between production and export of natural resources since the domestic
market can only take up a very limited amount of these products, beyond which
any production increases need to be exported. It is in the nature of these products
that they are mainly produced for export.
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extent that increased extraction goes hand in hand with unsustainable
resource use. The problem is that there are no international data available,
indicating the sustainability of resource use.
Our data cover the period 1979–1999, but the ﬁrst two years are lost in the
process of estimation due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable
and the need for instrumenting it. We use the net present value of the total
debt service to exports ratio as our variable of indebtedness in the main
analysis and three other variables in sensitivity analysis: ﬁrst, the total debt
service to gross national income ratio; second, the total debt stock to exports
ratio; third, the total debt stock to the gross national income ratio. Apart
from the net present value of total debt service to exports ratio, which is
computed byEasterly (2001), all variables are taken fromWorldBank (2000).
To control for the effect of endowments on natural resource extraction and
production, we use estimates of the available reserve stock for the energy
and mineral resources. Data are taken from a variety of sources, including
WRI (various years), US Bureau ofMines (various years), British Petroleum
(various years), and OPEC (various years). Note that no data for silver
and gold reserves could be established. For cash crops no crop-speciﬁc
endowment data are available. As an admittedly crude proxy, we use the
percentage of a country’s land area that is considered arable, with data
taken from World Bank (2001b). In sensitivity analysis, we replaced this
variable with the share of permanent cropland as a percentage of arable
land, without ﬁnding any major change of results.
As further control variables, we included the real effective exchange rate
and the gross domestic product (GDP) in constant US$ prices of 1995 as
a proxy for domestic market size. Following Kahn and McDonald (1994,
1995), as discussed in the section above, we also included the labour
force participation rate, the gross domestic investment rate, and the ratio
of government spending to GDP, even though we ﬁnd their theoretical
argument for the inclusion of these variables not compelling. Apart from
the exchange rate data,whichwere taken from IMF (various years), all other
data came from World Bank (2001b). As control variables speciﬁc for each
resource, we used very crude estimates of the unit resource rent for fossil
fuel and mineral resources (World Bank, 2001a) and the unit export value
for cash crops (FAO, 2002). Due to gaps in data availability, these further
control variables are included in sensitivity analysis only in order to keep
the sample size for the main estimations as large as possible.
5. Results
Table 1 presents the estimates for all energy and mineral resources. Table 2
presents the results for the cash crops. Estimations are based on the
Arellano–Bond dynamic panel estimator with the indebtedness variable
entered both contemporaneously as well as in lagged form. As mentioned
above, to have the greatest sample possible, indebtedness and endowments
are the only explanatory variables other than the lagged dependent variable
in these estimations. In sensitivity analysis, we entered the other control
variables as well. For the estimates to be consistent, it is important that
there is no second-order autocorrelation. As can be seen from table 1 and










Table 1. Natural resource extraction
Bauxite Copper Gas Gold Hardcoal Iron Lead
Pt−1 0.31 1.08∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗
(1.37) (33.40) (8.60) (30.98) (37.30) (26.00) (37.31)
(NPV of TDS/exports)t 24.5 2.8 −25.0 0.087 −763.2 86.5 0.083
(1.19) (0.92) (1.54) (0.35) (1.14) (0.28) (0.15)
(NPV of TDS/export)t−1 −37.1∗ −1.7 −11.4 0.53 792.2 458.4 1.98
(1.82) (0.68) (1.23) (1.03) (1.14) (1.51) (1.25)
Reserve stock 0.50 5.11∗∗∗ 39.8∗ n.a. 1.34∗∗ −10.4∗∗∗ 2.52
(0.65) (4.18) (1.73) (2.29) (4.22) (1.04)
combined p-value debt variables 0.2354 0.6514 0.2956 0.5474 0.5123 0.3086 0.3925
observations 284 475 686 656 596 468 414
countries 22 38 51 47 45 36 32
Test of autocovariance in residuals 0.0612 0.4316 0.0925 0.7734 0.1115 0.2802 0.9633
of order 2 is zero
Lignite Oil Phosphate Silver Tin Zinc
Pt−1 0.73∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗
(12.15) (10.17) (7.38) (9.04) (39.53) (32.56)
(NPV of TDS/exports)t −236.7 220.3 −47.2 0.003 −0.30 3.7
(0.41) (0.56) (0.64) (1.03) (1.05) (1.60)
(NPV of TDS/export)t−1 −253.3 479.9 128.8 −0.004 0.41 −0.27
(0.44) (1.27) (1.37) (1.01) (1.19) (.19)
Reserve stock 0.057 306.3∗ −28.95∗∗∗ n.a. −2.20 5.04
(0.22) (1.87) (3.83) (1.57) (1.31)
combined p-value debt variables 0.4683 0.3396 0.2405 0.4295 0.4898 0.1411
observations 244 776 375 509 272 427
countries 24 54 28 39 23 32
Test of autocovariance in residuals 0.1404 0.2225 0.2734 0.3379 0.6489 0.0846
of order 2 is zero
Note: Coefﬁcients of constant and time dummies not reported. Robust standard errors. Absolute z-values in parentheses.







Table 2. Cash crop production
Bananas Cashewnuts Cocoa Coffee Cotton
Pt−1 1.0∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗ 0.30∗
(12.36) (6.08) (22.10) (2.11) (1.71)
(NPV of TDS/exports)t 0.93 −0.04 −3.4 −4.6 0.45
(0.60) (0.34) (1.55) (1.19) (0.15)
(NPV of TDS/export)t−1 1.57 0.00 1.9 0.86 6.0
(0.73) (0.01) (1.38) (0.20) (1.22)
Arable land as % of total land −17.3 −1.21 3.1 −8.1 3.5
(1.24) (1.19) (1.50) (1.55) (0.23)
combined p-value debt variables 0.6806 0.9301 0.2987 0.0781 0.4391
observations 1,092 443 696 934 1,169
countries 66 28 38 56 75
Test of autocovariance in residuals 0.2109 0.1916 0.2208 0.1230 0.2696
of order 2 is zero
Rubber Soybeans Sugarcane Tea Tobacco
Pt−1 0.98∗∗∗ 0.29∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(41.96) (1.71) (28.95) (26.64) (54.08)
(NPV of TDS/exports)t −2.7 0.45 −42.2 −0.05 2.9
(0.85) (0.15) (1.36) (0.25) (0.94)
(NPV of TDS/export)t−1 0.86 6.0 19.4 −0.00 −2.6∗
(0.22) (1.22) (0.90) (0.02) (1.84)
Arable land as % of total land 4.45 3.4 −19.4 −0.28 2.3
(0.67) (0.22) (0.42) (0.60) (0.60)
combined p-value debt variables 0.6967 0.4413 0.3529 0.9279 0.1195
observations 394 1,190 886 623 1,419
countries 24 76 65 39 94
Test of autocovariance in residuals 0.2470 0.2696 0.9623 0.3334 0.3072
of order 2 is zero
Note: Coefﬁcients of constant and time dummies not reported. Robust standard errors. Absolute z-values in parentheses.
∗statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level. ∗∗at 5% level. ∗∗∗at 0.1% level.
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of no second-order autocorrelation cannot be rejected at the 10 per cent
conﬁdence level. Even in the cases of bauxite, gas, and zinc, the hypothesis
fails to become rejected at the more demanding 5 per cent level. Note that
one of the indebtedness variables tests signiﬁcantly only in two cases out
of the 23 estimations reported in tables 1 and 2. For both bauxite and
tobacco, the estimated effect of indebtedness on production is actually
negative, which would contradict the DRH. More importantly, there is not
a single case where the indebtedness variable is estimated signiﬁcantly
in concordance with the DRH. Even the combined p-value is above the
10 per cent conﬁdence level in all cases but coffee.
The endowment variables are statistically signiﬁcant with the expected
positive sign only in few cases. For two minerals the estimated coefﬁcient
is signiﬁcant with a negative sign. The most likely reason for this failure to
test more in accordance with expectation is that for most mineral resources
the reserve stock data are derived from rather crude estimates that change
little over time. They are therefore subject tomeasurement error. In asmuch
as they change little over time, they are also captured to a great extent by
the country-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects. It is notable that the reserve stock variable
is signiﬁcant with the expected positive sign for the cases of gas, oil, and
hardcoal, for which reserve stock estimates are generally better available.
The percentage of arable land is never statistically signiﬁcant in the cash
crop estimations. This variable hardly changes over time and is therefore
already captured by the country-speciﬁc effects such that its effect is almost
wiped out in the process of estimation. This is not problematic in our context
since we merely want to control for the effect of endowments, but have no
further interest in their effect on resource extraction.
6. Sensitivity analysis
Given the importance of the DRH and the rather striking results from
table 1 and table 2 failing to ﬁnd any evidence in its favour, the results
were subjected to a whole battery of sensitivity analyses.5 For example, the
results reported in these tables remain valid if one of the other proxies for
a country’s indebtedness – the total debt service to gross national income,
total debt stock to exports, total debt stock to gross national income – is
used instead. The same is true if the variables are entered in combination
with each other. Results remain valid if the variables are entered in logged
form. Introducing the other control variables does not change results
either. Results also remain valid if the 2SLS ﬁrst-differenced estimator
is used instead of the Arellano–Bond estimator, if no lags are used or
further lags are included, if instead of lagged debt variables, which create
problems with multicollinearity, moving averages are used that include the
contemporaneous value and two prior years.
Whilst instrumenting the lagged dependent variable avoids its cor-
relation with the error term, the estimation can be very inefﬁcient if the
instruments areweak. In otherwords, estimation is inefﬁcient if further lags
are bad predictors of the lagged dependent variables. Researchers therefore
5 Detailed results are available from the author upon request.
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sometimes estimate models such as equation (1) with a ﬁxed-effects or ﬁrst-
differenced estimator without using instruments, trading off biasedness
against inefﬁciency. If we do so, our results do not change. Sometimes,
researchers even hesitate to include a lagged dependent variable as it
absorbs much of the variation in the data, leaving little to the other
independent variables. However, our results did not change if the lagged
dependent variable is dropped from the model, which is then estimated
with a ﬁxed-effects or ﬁrst-differenced estimator. The same is true if the
model is estimated with a random-effects or between estimator.
In eachof these sensitivity tests, naturally it happens that invery fewcases
the proxy variable for indebtedness assumes some marginal signiﬁcance,
sometimes with a positive sign, sometimes with a negative sign. However,
with hundreds of estimations undertaken this is of course not further
surprising given the nature of hypothesis testing with conﬁdence intervals.
That these few incidences are likely to be down to chance is supported
by the fact that indebtedness does not become consistently marginally
signiﬁcant for any speciﬁc resource. The major result is therefore robust:
there is no evidence for a statistically signiﬁcant effect of indebtedness on
natural resource exploitation.
7. Conclusion
There is a tendency in the applied econometric literature to report analyses
only if they have found statistically signiﬁcant results with respect to the
variables of interest. Sometimes, however, the ﬁnding that a particular vari-
able does not have a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on a dependent
variable can be equally important. Arguably, this is the case here.We clearly
fail to reject the hypothesis of no relationship between indebtedness and the
extent of resource extraction. Our results reported above therefore fail to
provide evidence for the DRH.We did not ﬁnd evidence that countries with
higher debt levels or higher debt service burdens have higher exploitation
of subsoil fossil fuel and mineral resources or higher production of cash
crops than other countries.
Our ﬁndings support the doubt expressed by others – for example, Reed
(1992), Barrow (1995), and Pearce et al. (1995) – with respect to the
validity of the DRH. It should warn us against accepting the DRH too
easily. The widespread popularity of the hypothesis stands in stark contrast
to the rather shaky empirical evidence it is built upon. Equally well,
however, one must warn against taking the results as deﬁnite proof against
the DRH. To start with, due to data constraints, we cannot really assess
whether higher indebtedness has prompted countries to resort to more
unsustainable resource use without an increase in the level of resource
extraction. It is unlikely that a switch to (more) unsustainable resource
use would not be accompanied by higher resource exploitation, but its
possibility cannot be ruled out either. Further, as mentioned already, testing
the determinants of natural resource exploitation is a complicated task,
rendered difﬁcult by conceptual uncertainty and poor data availability.
First differencing, inclusion of year-speciﬁc time dummies and a lagged
dependent variable can mitigate omitted variable bias, but it cannot fully
avoid it. If indebtedness is correlated with variables that are still omitted,
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then our results can be biased. Furthermore, our resource endowment data
are rather crude and often subject to measurement error. Perhaps there are
limits to large-scale quantitative testing of such hypotheses. But our results
demonstrate that there is no systematic quantitative evidence for the DRH,
the validity of which is simply taken as a given by many.
One might wonder whether it really matters that there is little evidence
for the DRH. Shilling (1992: 28) believes it does, since continued belief
in the DRH in spite of the absence of empirical evidence in its favour ‘is
potentially dangerous, because it confuses the causes and cures, and thus,
if acted upon, might lead to inequitable solutions, validate inappropriate
behaviour, and create moral hazards’. Debt forgiveness, for example, might
be desirable for any number of other reasons, but this analysis has shown
that there is no reason to expect that it will lead to reduced natural resource
exploitation.
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